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"THE IMPACT OF WEBER
24 By Geoffrey H. Simmons
By now most Americans have read or
heard about the Supreme Court's June
27, 1979 decision in the case of United
Steelworkers of America v. Brian F
Weber. Some people have disagreed
with the court's holding while others have
praised the court's 5-2 ruling. Most dis-
cussions have centered on the meaning
of Section 703(d) of Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act and whether a literal
reading of that section, which was de-
signed to outlaw any form of racial dis-
crimination by an employer, would pro-
hibit Kaiser Aluminum from establishing
a race-conscious job training program to
increase the number of Black skilled
craft workers in its plant in Gramercy, La.
The majority of the justices said, in
effect, that the spirit of the statute would
permit the continuation of the type of
program that was in operation in the
Gramercy plant.
Business executives had watched the
progression of Weber through the courts
with much concern. They were anxious
to ascertain the impact of the case on
affirmative action. Before Weber, mana-
gers believed that they could not engage
in race-conscious affirmative action pro-
grams to increase minority representa-
tion without the court first determining
that there had been a history of past
discrimination at their particular industry
or business. And most personnel and
legal counsel offices were convinced
that their businesses would be making
themselves liable for lawsuits if they ad-
mitted to participating in unlawful and
discriminatory practices in the past.
Therefore, companies were hesitant to
establish voluntary programs to increase
opportunities for minorities that took race
or sex into account. The dilemma was
now apparent: "If we continue to have a
racially imbalanced work-force we will
be subject to lawsuits by minorities seek-
ing employment and promotions; on the
other hand, if we hire minorities to
ameliorate the imbalance and promote
minorities over whites without regard to
seniority we will be accused of reverse
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Editor's note -In Commentary, which
appears elsewhere in this edition, col-
umnist Carl Rowan makes note of
Bakke and Weber, two recent Supreme
Court decisions. We have previously
dealt with the Bakke case in our Octo-
ber 1977 and October 1978 editions.
The following article by Geoffrey Sim-
mons, a 1974 Phi Beta Kappa at How-
ard University, and a 1977 graduate of
discrimination." What can we do?"
These kind of statements were common
among corporate executives across the
country.
In a survey commissioned by Barn-
hill-Hayes, Inc, (a management consult-
ing firm specializing in affirmative action)
during January of 1979, it was discov-
ered that management's greatest affir-
mative action concerns were, first, being
fined for past discrimination; second, los-
ing government contracts; and third, ad-
verse publicity. These factors under-
score the importance of management
seeking assurances when establishing
programs, such as the one adopted at
the Kaiser plant.
To understand the possible impact of
Weber on the business community, one
must examine the history of the case and
the impressions of the attorneys who liti-
gated the case before the Supreme
Court. It is they who can best give the
public guidance as to the method by
which this case ought to be utilized.
One of the lawyers is Michael H. Got-
tesman, of the law firm of Bredhoff, Got-
tesman, Cohen and Weinberg, in Wash-
ington, D. C., who represented the
Steelworkers Union.
While addressing members of the
Labor and Employment Law Section of
the American Bar Association in Dallas,
Texas, last August, Gottesman dis-
cussed his impressions of Weber and the
future of affirmative action in America.
"In 1973 the Steelworkers Union's Ex-
ecutive Board adopted a resolution that
called for some radical changes in the
collective bargaining rounds that were
coming up the following year in the steel,
aluminum and container industries," he
said. Further, Gottesman noted the talks
included the conversion of the seniority
system, among other things. One of the
important items mentioned, was a "pro-
vision that the union would seek quotas
for the filling of craft training jobs
throughout the industry. The Union put
this program to the bargaining table in all
three industries; negotiated for it and
succeeded in getting quotas in the col-
the Duke University School of Law, is
an assessment of the Weber decision
on affirmative action programs. Sim-
mons is presently a Namaskar Fellow
and is engaged in research dealing
with new developments in employment
opportunities for minorities. Formerly,
he was staff aide in the Office of the
Governor of North Carolina.
lective bargaining that year." The lawyers
thought that it might be "prudent to get an
umbrella over this revolutionary pro-
gram." They later met with government
officials and discussed the possibility of
a consent decree. The aluminum and
container industries had similar agree-
ments in their contracts, according to
Gottesman.
The program was a popular one and
was greeted at several plants with virtu-
ally no opposition. Brian Weber was the
only person, according to Gottesman, to
bring suit contesting the program. The
union met with lower level employees
and the plan was approved and ac-
cepted. It was ironic that the Gramercy
plant's new program was attacked by
Weber, since it was at this very plant that
the program was of substantial benefit to
Blacks as well as whites. Except at
Gramercy, several of the other plants
involved in the affirmative action pro-
gram had previously established some
type of apprenticeship programs.
Gottesman pointed out that the alumi-
num and container industries were dom-
inated by white males, while "minority
populations in the steel industry ex-
ceeded the number of minorities in the
labor-force, generally." However, there
were very few Blacks or other minorities
in the skilled craft unions. At the
Gramercy plant, Black employees were
less than two percent of its total number
of craft workers, even though 43 percent
of the surrounding Louisiana population
was Black. An argument that there had
been past discrimination in selecting
persons for the skilled craft training pro-
grams at this plant was uninviting since
there had never been a skilled craft trai n-
ing program.
The lower courts ruled in favor of
Weber because there had been no past
discrimination involved in the training
program. Gottesman said, "it was the
general wisdom of the lower courts,
heretofore, that a race-conscious pro-
gram designed to eliminate racial dis-
crimination is not in violation of Title VII
unless there is a finding of past discrimi-
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nation or if there is a reasonable basis to
believe that there has been discrimina-
tion."
The union argued before the Supreme
Court that "prior to 1964 an industry
could have any kind of race-conscious
program that it wanted and certainly the
1964Civil Rights Act was not designed to
prohibit an industry from voluntarily es-
tablishing such a program to the benefit
of Blacks." The union further argued that
"legislative history indicates that the
Congress did intend on this happening."
To support this position, Gottesman
compiled 70 pages of quotes from the
legislative history. This point is very im-
portant in light of the fact that many arti-
cles about the Weber case make much
ado about the dissent by Justice William
Rehnquist and the fact it is saturated with
legislative history while little legislative
history is noted in the majority's decision.
What the Court Said in Weber
The Supreme Court did not outline the full
range of permissible affirmative action
programs. The court held that, wherever
the line is, this case (Weber) falls within
that line. There are four aspects about
the program approved in Weber that
may give guidance to the private sector:
• There were no white employees
displaced by the program.
• The program was designed to be
temporary. It was agreed that once the
number of Blacks in the skilledtcraft
jobs approximated the number of
Blacks in the labor-force of the locality,
the program would then be eliminated.
• The formula used to choose per-
sons for the program was based on a
50/50 scheme. One Black would be
chosen for every white chosen.
• The program was designed to elim-
inate a racial imbalance in an area of
employment traditionally denied to
women and racial minorities.
When examining the program at the
Kaiser plant in Gramercy, one can see
many possibilities for industry to be crea-
tive and ambitious in its quest to beef up
affirmative action efforts. .
Another lawyer, Thompson Powers, of
the Washington law firm of Steptoe &
Johnson, who was counsel for Kaiser,
said, during the American Bar Associa-
tion meeting in Dallas, that there are
many possibilities after Weber. More
middle management white-collar jobs
could be filled by minorities using the
arguments presented in the Weber case
and paralleling those arguments to cor-
porate business situations. Blacks and
women who are seldom seen on Wall
Street in brokerage firms or in large law
firms may find themselves beneficiaries
of the Weber decision, Powers noted.
There are many areas where minorities
have been traditionally excluded that
may now become accessible. Business
executives in the South may find that by
establishing training programs in indus-
tries, such as electronic parts-producing
plants, they can increase Black em-
ployment in the areas where their firms
are beginning to locate. Many of these
areas have large Black labor-forces.
Powers noted that a company can find
a way to increase affirmative action if
there is a commitment to do so.
Weber makes it easier for a company
to make such a commitment, says
Charles Lawrence, III, co-author of a
recent book, The Bakke Case, and visit-
ing professor at the Harvard Law School.
Lawrence says that Weber gives indus-
try the green light to move forward on
affirmative action. But he warns: there
must still be incentives available for in-
dustry or it will not establish voluntary
programs. Likewise, he states, "pressure
must be put on industry to respond posi-
tively to Weber Civil rights organizations
should talk with industry leaders and get
them to do now that which can legally be
done. Weber frees industry to demon-
strate its commitment to affirmative ac-
tion without the threat of lawsuits claim-
ing reverse discrimination."
Unanswered Questions
The Supreme Court did not decide
-whether an industry can fill 100% of its
existing vacancies with minorities. The
cou rt refused to state definitively whether 25
a goal can be set on hiring minorities that
exceeds the number in the labor-force.
The court did not define the limits for a
"temporary" program. Government offi-
cials were not covered by Weber
Eleanor Holmes Norton of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission
said recently that the Supreme Court left
"great room for business to proceed ..
without looking over its shoulders for
possible 'reverse discrimination' liabil-
ity." She also said that her agency's new
systematic program would not be di-
rected at companies that use the Weber
initiative to correct class-wide discrimi-
nation on their own, but would concen-
trate on companies that remained
recalcitrant. 0
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